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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MU ING LIN 
a/k/a Mu Jing Lin 
a/k/a Mu Jin Lin, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
   Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a 
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A077-340-396) 
Immigration Judge: Daniel A. Meisner 
________________________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on January 16, 2020 
 
Before:  JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: May 13, 2021) 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 







KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Mu Ing Lin seeks review of the BIA’s denial of her motion to reopen her 
immigration proceedings.  We will deny the petition for review. 
Lin is a Chinese national.  She was ordered removed by the BIA in 2006.  But Lin 
remained in the country and gave birth to twin U.S. citizen children.  In 2018, she filed a 
motion to reopen her case with the BIA, seeking cancellation of removal.  By then, Lin had 
plainly satisfied two eligibility criteria for cancellation that she had not at the time of her 
initial removal order:  She had accrued ten years of physical presence1 and she had given 
birth to qualifying U.S. citizen children.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A), (D). 
 Lin’s motion to reopen did not, however, demonstrate that she met the key criterion 
for cancellation: that her removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship” to her U.S. citizen children.  See id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).  Rather, while a motion 
to reopen “must be accompanied by the appropriate application for relief and all supporting 
documentation,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), Lin submitted no documentation related to her 
two children besides their birth certificates.  Thus, we are compelled to agree with the BIA 
that Lin “vaguely assert[ed] in her motion, without reference to any evidence,” that her 
children would suffer hardship and that these vague assertions were insufficient to clear 
even the relatively low bar of prima facie eligibility.  See AR 4 (citing Matter of L-O-G-, 
21 I. & N. Dec. 413, 418 (BIA 1996)).  We will therefore deny the petition for review. 
 
1 The Government’s argument that Lin failed to accrue ten years of physical 
presence is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 
593 U.S. ___, No. 19-863, 2021 WL 1676619, at *9 (Apr. 29, 2021). 
